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PERCEPTIONS OF CASE COMPLEXITY AND PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY
THROUGH THE LENS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING
Cassandra Flick
University of Wyoming, Graduate Program in Psychology and Law
Judith Platania
Roger Williams University
ABSTRACT
In the current study we examined the influence of case complexity and pretrial publicity (PTP)
through an information processing framework. Dual process models suggest that individuals can
process information in a systematic or heuristic manner. We explored the effects of defendant
PTP (negative v. positive), language complexity (moderate v. high), and image complexity
(moderate v. high) on participant-jurors’ verdicts, damages, and information processing style.
Results indicated participants exposed to highly complex language utilized PTP as a heuristic to
determine damages. Language and image complexity interacted to predict jurors’ understanding
of trial information.
INTRODUCTION
Research indicates that individuals can engage in one of two processing styles when evaluating
novel information. With this in mind, both the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1981) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al.,
1989) suggest that individuals participate in either effortful systematic processing or less
strenuous heuristic processing. During systematic processing, individuals carefully scrutinize and
consider all judgment-relevant information before forming a decision (Todorov et al., 2002). In
contrast, heuristic processing is less cognitively taxing and involves the use of mental shortcuts,
simple decision-rules, or heuristic cues to form judgments. Research finds that highly complex
information results in an increased reliance on heuristic processing (Cooper et al., 1996; Schuller
et al., 2005). Interestingly, research suggests that utilizing heuristics in a legal context can bias
juror decisions (Lieberman, 2002). With this in mind, in the current study we utilized complexity
of case information to examine the influence of a common extra-legal factor, pretrial publicity
(PTP), on participant-jurors’ reliance on heuristics.
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Heuristic Cues and Case Complexity
Research finds that complex and technical language commonly used in trials can increase jurors’
heuristic processing by hindering their ability to remember and process trial evidence (Horowitz
et al., 2001). That said, heuristic processing appears to be more prevalent in civil cases compared
to criminal (McKimmie et al., 2013). Within this context, perceptions of expert witnesses also
appear to be affected by language complexity, thus increasing jurors’ reliance on heuristic
processing (Schuller et al., 2005). Schuller and colleagues (2005) found that a male expert was
perceived as more persuasive than a female expert, however only when the trial was highly
complex. In addition, participant-jurors exposed to a highly complex trial awarded significantly
greater damages compared to those exposed to a less complex trial (Schuller et al., 2005).
Horowitz and colleagues (1996) found that while complex language did not have a direct effect
on mock jurors’ memory performance it did affect their ability to appropriately compensate
differentially-worthy plaintiffs. Thus, jurors appear to utilize salient heuristic cues when they
lack the cognitive resources to process highly complex trial information.
Contrary to language complexity, the effect of image complexity on information processing style
has been considerably understudied, particularly in a legal context. Generally, research indicates
that image complexity ultimately has an effect on memory for that image. While the effect of
image complexity on related verbal information, rather than the image itself, is undetermined,
findings from language complexity research suggest that increased image complexity may hinder
individuals’ understanding and systematic processing of related information and thus result in
decreased memory for that information. With this in mind, images have the potential to serve as
a particularly useful tool to aid jurors’ systematic processing in a trial context.
Finally, pretrial publicity (PTP) can lead jurors to form biased legal opinions (Fulero, 2002). The
most commonly presented type of PTP in mock juror research is negative defendant PTP.
Results of meta-analytic research indicate that negative defendant PTP is significantly associated
with increased guilty verdicts (Steblay et al., 1999). In terms of defendant PTP, Bakhshay and
Haney (2018) found that the most common form of positive PTP and the second most common
form of negative PTP was character-related. Positive character-related PTP consisted of
statements describing the defendant as “good” or “very nice”. Negative PTP consisted of
statements describing the defendant as “a monster” or “feared by his own family”. As a result,
both negative defendant and positive defendant PTP appear to bias mock jurors’ legal judgments.
Current Study
The current study utilized an automobile negligence case in order to examine the influence of
case complexity and PTP on participant-jurors’ legal judgments and understanding of trial
information. We manipulated language complexity used by an expert witness (moderately
complex v. highly complex) and image complexity of an image that accompanied the expert’s
testimony (moderately complex v. highly complex). Additionally, we manipulated participants’
exposure to PTP as either positive or negative defendant PTP. We were primarily interested in
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how these factors would affect participant-jurors’ liability decisions and damages awarded, as
well as their understanding and processing of trial information. We examine PTP as a heuristic
cue in this context, utilizing character-related PTP.
In accordance with the literature discussed above, we hypothesized:
H1: A PTP x Language Complexity x Image Complexity interaction on dichotomous liability
decisions. Specifically, participants exposed to highly complex language and a highly complex
image would render their verdicts as a function of PTP (positive PTP: not liable; negative PTP:
liable).
H2: A PTP x Language Complexity x Image Complexity interaction on damages awarded, such
that for participants who found the defendant liable, those exposed to highly complex language
and a highly complex image would award damages as a function of PTP (positive PTP: lower
damages; negative PTP: higher damages).
H3: A Language Complexity x Image Complexity interaction on (a) participants’ perceived
understanding of the case as well as the expert, and (b) their information processing style.
Participants exposed to highly complex language and a highly complex image would (a)
perceive the case and the expert to be more difficult to understand and (b) would process the trial
information less systematically, as evidenced in their memory for trial information.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants included 200 (110 males, 89 females, 1 transgender) jury-eligible individuals (at
least 18 years old and US citizens) recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Power analysis indicated that 200 participants allowed for adequate power (0.71) to
detect a medium-sized effect (0.25) (G*Power; Faul, et al., 2007). Forty-five percent of our
sample was 18-34 years old, 27% 35-44 years old, and the remaining 28% 45 or older.
Participants received $1.00 in compensation, credited to their MTurk account. We utilized a 2
(Defendant PTP: positive v. negative) x 2 (Language Complexity: moderate v. high) x 2 (Image
Complexity: moderate v. high) between-subjects design. Cell sizes ranged from 22 to 28.
Materials and Procedure
Our materials included two versions of an online newspaper article and four versions of a written
automobile negligence trial summary. Positive PTP presented Wal-Mart Corporation’s
(defendant) commitment to the community and ways in which the company makes a positive
difference in local communities. Negative PTP presented Wal-Mart’s tendency to take over local
stores and hurt small businesses and community members. The trial summary was based on
Morgan et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al. (2014). The trial summary consisted of judge’s
initial instructions, plaintiff and defense arguments, engineer expert testimony presented on
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behalf of the plaintiff, expert cross-examination, closing arguments, and judge’s closing
instructions. The key facts of the case stated that a truck rear-ended the plaintiff’s car late at
night on a stretch of highway that had ongoing construction. Prior to the accident, Wal-Mart was
aware of the truck’s faulty braking system and had instructed their out-sourced trucking
company (Swift Transportation) to fix the brakes on the truck. Swift Transportation notified
Wal-Mart that they did not have time to fix the brakes. Swift Transportation was operating the
truck at the time of the accident.
Our language and image complexity manipulations took place during the engineer’s expert
testimony. We utilized the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) Index for this manipulation, which ranges
from 0-100 with higher numbers indicating easier readability. For moderate complexity, FRE
Index was 60.6 indicating “standard” readability. For high complexity, the Index was 25.3
indicating “very confusing” readability. For our image complexity manipulation, we utilized two
versions of an automobile braking system image. This image accompanied the expert testimony
and varied in terms of the level of detail present in the image. All manipulations were confirmed
through pilot research.
Participants first read one of two online PTP articles described above and were then instructed
they would serve as a juror in an automobile negligence case. They then read one of the versions
of the trial summary followed by judge’s instructions. Lastly, participants completed a variety of
dependent measures described below before being debriefed and provided with their code for
payment.
Measures
First, participants were provided with a legal definition of negligence and asked to form a
dichotomous liability decision. Next, participants who found Wal-Mart negligent read a legal
definition of compensatory damages and asked to determine the amount Wal-Mart was liable to
pay the plaintiff. Awards ranged from $300,000 to $5 million (M = $2 million, SD = $1.2
million). Participants then completed the following 2 items: “How difficult was the case to
understand?” (M = 2.47, SD = 1.81), and “How difficult was the engineer’s expert testimony to
understand?” (M = 2.68, SD = 1.80). Each was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all
difficult to 7 = extremely difficult).
Next, participants completed 12 items that assessed their memory for trial information. For each
item, participants determined whether the statement was presented in the trial (e.g., the accident
took place late at night on the highway) or not (e.g., the driver of the truck attempted to swerve
before the accident) and included eight true trial facts and four plausible lure items that were not
presented in the trial. These 12 items were coded as correct or incorrect. For each participant we
calculated percentage correct and divided the number of correct facts or lures by the total
number of facts or lures. Percent correct for true trial facts ranged from 63% to 100% (M = 96%,
SD = 6%); for plausible lures 0% to 100% (M = 49%, SD = 38%). The average memory accuracy
for true trial facts was extremely high (96% correct), however average accuracy for plausible
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lures was lower (49%). Thus, participants were not as accurate at distinguishing whether or not
lures were presented at trial. Given this, as well as the ceiling effect for memory of trial facts, we
utilized this susceptibility to lure items as our measure of memory for trial information. Thus,
percentage correct for lure items (0%-100%) served as our measure of memory for trial
information.
Lastly, in order to control for individual differences in preference for complex thinking,
participants completed the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984). The efficient
NFC scale consisted of 12 items, which were summed to create a NFC Score measure ranging
from 26 to 88 (M = 61.92, SD = 12.27) with higher values indicating a greater need for
cognition.
RESULTS
Liability Decisions
In order to examine Hypothesis 1, we conducted a 2 (PTP: positive v. negative) x 2 (Language
Complexity: moderate v. high) x 2 (Image Complexity: moderate v. high) x 2 (Liability
Decision: not liable v. liable) hierarchical loglinear analysis with backward elimination. A
significant Language Complexity x Liability Decision (IV/DV) association was found: χ2 (1, N =
200) = 4.48, p = .034. Post hoc analysis (in the form of a 2 x 2 contingency table) showed an
odds ratio of 2.66 indicating participants exposed to highly complex language were over twice as
likely to find Wal-Mart not negligent compared to those exposed to less complex language, χ2 (1,
N = 200) = 4.51, p = .034. While this finding supports Hypothesis 1, we provide a more detailed
description of this finding in our discussion.
Damages Awarded
In order to examine Hypothesis 2, we conducted a 2 (PTP: positive v. negative) x 2 (Language
Complexity: moderate v. high) x 2 (Image Complexity: moderate v. high) analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA), controlling for participants’ NFC score, on compensatory damages awarded for
those who found Wal-Mart liable. Our findings indicated partial support for Hypothesis 2 as our
results revealed a marginally significant PTP x Language Complexity interaction, F(1, 168) =
3.64, p = .058, partial eta squared = .021. Simple effects analysis revealed that PTP marginally
affected damages when language complexity was high, p = 0.064. Specifically, when exposed to
highly complex language participants awarded higher damages when exposed to negative PTP
compared to positive PTP. See Table 1 for interaction means.

Table 1. Interaction Means for PTP x Language Complexity on Amount Awarded
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Language
Pre-Trial Publicity
Complexity
Positive
Negative
High
$1.706 ($1.18)
$2.22 ($1.33)
Moderate
$2.13 ($1.21)
$1.93 ($1.26)
Note: Amounts represented in millions, SD in parentheses. (N = 176).
Difficulty Understanding the Case and Information Processing Style
In order to examine Hypothesis 3a, we conducted a 2 (Language Complexity: moderate v. high)
x 2 (Image Complexity: moderate v. high) multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA),
controlling for participants NFC Score. We utilized our two dependent measures that assessed
perceived difficulty of understanding the case and the expert testimony. Results indicated a
significant Language Complexity x Image Complexity interaction on the combined dependent
variables after controlling for NFC Score, F(2, 189) = 3.06, p = .049, Wilks’ Lambda = .97,
partial eta squared = .031, thus supporting Hypothesis 3a. Tests of between-subjects effects
indicated a significant Language Complexity x Image Complexity interaction for each individual
item. For case understanding, F(1, 190) = 4.18, p = .042, partial eta squared = .022; and expert
testimony: F(1, 190) = 6.15, p = .014, partial eta squared = .031. Simple effects analysis revealed
that language complexity significantly affected perceptions of case difficulty when image
complexity was high, F(1, 196) = 4.21, p = 0.04. Specifically, when exposed to a highly complex
image, participants perceived the case to be more difficult to understand when trial language was
highly complex. See Table 2 for interactions means.
Table 2. Interaction Means for Image x Language Complexity on Case Understanding
Language
Image Complexity
Complexity
Moderate
High
High
2.31 (1.73)
2.92 (2.03)
Moderate
2.45 (1.88)
2.18 (1.51)
Note: DV scaled 1 = not at all difficult to 7 = extremely difficult. SD in parentheses (N = 194).

We then examined the effect of the interaction on participants’ perceived understanding of the
expert testimony. Similarly, simple effects analysis revealed that language complexity
significantly affected understanding of expert testimony when image complexity was high, F(1,
194) = 8.95, p = 0.003. When participants were exposed to a highly complex image, they
perceived the expert testimony to be more difficult to understand when language complexity was
high (M = 3.32, SE = 0.25) compared to moderate (M = 2.26, SE = 0.25). Furthermore, image
complexity significantly affected understanding of expert testimony, but only when language
complexity was high, F(1,194) = 4.92, p = 0.028. Specifically, when exposed to highly complex
language, participants had greater difficulty understanding the expert testimony when image
complexity was high compared to moderate. See Table 3 for interaction means.
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Table 3. Interaction Means for Image x Language Complexity on Expert Understanding
Language
Image Complexity
Complexity
Moderate
High
High
2.53 (1.45)
3.32 (1.91)
Moderate
2.59 (2.04)
2.26 (1.61)
Note: DV scaled 1 = not at all difficult to 7 = extremely difficult. SD in parentheses N = 195.
In order to examine Hypothesis 3b, we conducted a 2 (Language Complexity: moderate v. high)
x 2 (Image Complexity: moderate v. high) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for
participants’ NFC score, on participants’ memory for trial information (i.e., percentage correct
for lure items). Although this hypotheis was not directly supported, our results indicated a
trending Language Complexity x Image interaction, F(1, 191) = 2.95, p = 0.08, ηp2 = .015.
Simple effects analysis revealed that language complexity significantly affected memory when
image complexity was high, F(1, 195) = 5.62, p = 0.019. Specifically, when exposed to a highly
complex image, participants had significantly worse memory when language complexity was
high (M = 37.4%, SE = 0.054) compared to moderate (M = 55.1%, SE = 0.054). Additionally,
image complexity marginally affected memory when language complexity was high, F(1, 195) =
3.66, p = 0.057. Specifically, when exposed to highly complex language, participants had
marginally worse memory when image complexity was high (M = 37.4%, SE = 0.054)
compared to moderate (M = 53.0%, SE = 0.054). See Table 4 for interaction means.
Table 4. Interaction Means for Image x Language Complexity on Memory
Language
Image Complexity
Complexity
Moderate
High
High
53.0% (0.052)
37.4% (0.053)
Moderate
52.5% (0.053)
55.1% (0.054)
Note: DV ranges from 0% to 100%. SE in parentheses. N = 196.
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Dependent Measures
Amount
defendant is
liable to pay
plaintiff
Amount
defendant is
liable to pay
plaintiff
Overall level of
case
understanding
Difficulty
understanding
engineer's
testimony
% correct of lures

Overall level
of case
understanding

Difficulty
understanding
engineer's
testimony

%
correct
of lures

Defendant
liability
determination

.145*
.020
199

.187**
.004
197

-.079
.134
198

.238**
.000
199

1

.823**
.000
198

-.605**
.000
199

-.152*
.016
200

1

-.518**
.000
197

-.075
.145
198

1

.233**
.000
199

1
199
.145*
.020
199

200

.187**
.004
197

.823**
.000
198

198

-.079
.134
198

-.605**
.000
199

-.518**
.000
197

199

-.075
.145
198

.233**
.000
199

Defendant
.238**
-.152*
liability
.000
.016
determination
199
200
Note: *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (one-tailed).
N = 197 – 200 for all cases listed.
DISCUSSION

In the current study, we examined the effects of PTP, language complexity, and image
complexity on participant-jurors’ legal judgments and information processing style. Results
indicated that language complexity affected liability decisions, PTP interacted with language
complexity to affect damage awards, and language complexity interacted with image complexity
to affect understanding and information processing. Specifically, in terms of liability decisions,
results point to partial support for Hypothesis 1. Participants exposed to highly complex
language were more likely to find Wal-Mart not liable. While we originally hypothesized that
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1
200

participant-jurors exposed to a highly complex trial (i.e., high language and image complexity)
would determine their verdict as a function of PTP, observed results suggest a distinction
between heuristic and systematic processing. Given that a vast majority of our participant-jurors
found Wal-Mart liable in the current case, language complexity’s association with not liable
verdicts suggests that those exposed to highly complex language may have processed the trial
less systematically. In other words, due to the distribution of verdicts in the current case (88%
Liable v. 12% Not Liable) the trial facts appeared to favor the plaintiff and were not ambiguous.
Thus, those who found Wal-Mart not liable may have been processing the trial facts less
systematically.
For those who found Wal-Mart liable, results indicated partial support for Hypothesis 2, such
that PTP and language complexity affected damage awards. Results provide clear support for a
distinction between systematic and heuristic processing as a function of PTP and language
complexity. Pretrial publicity acted as a heuristic cue to determine damages when participants
were exposed to highly complex language, but the same trend was not seen when participants
were exposed to moderately complex language. Thus, participants exposed to highly complex
language awarded significantly higher damages when they were exposed to negative PTP
compared to positive PTP.
The results regarding damages are in accordance with previous studies finding that language
complexity significantly impacted damages awarded in civil cases (see Lieberman, 2002; Ruva
& McEvoy, 2008; Schuller et al., 2005). For example, Lieberman (2002) found that participants
encouraged to process heuristically awarded significantly lower damages when the defendant
was attractive, compared to participants encouraged to process systematically who did not show
the same attractive-leniency effect. Furthermore, Schuller and colleagues (2005) found that
participants awarded significantly higher damages when language was highly complex. Results
from the current study and previous literature indicate support for the effect of information
processing style on damages awarded in civil litigation cases.
Our findings also provide support for Hypothesis 3, such that language complexity interacted
with image complexity to affect jurors’ understanding of the case and also how well they
remembered trial information. When participants were exposed to a trial with highly complex
language and a highly complex image, they: (a) perceived the case and the expert testimony as
more difficult to understand and (b) had worse memory for trial information. When image
complexity was high, participants’ perceived case difficultly as a function of language
complexity (moderate: less difficult; high: more difficult). Furthermore, when image complexity
was high, participants remembered trial information as a function of language complexity
(moderate: better memory; high: worse memory). Similar effects were seen for image
complexity when language complexity was high. Participants perceived expert testimony to be
more difficult to understand when image complexity was high, compared to moderate.
Additionally, participants had worse memory for trial information when image complexity was
high compared to moderate. The same effect of image complexity was not seen when trial
language was less complex.
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Importantly, our findings suggest evidence of a dual process model of information processing.
Language complexity results support previous research that indicates complex and technical
language can hinder jurors’ ability to remember information (Horowitz et al., 2001) and that as
jurors’ ability to remember trial information decreases their systematic processing decreases
(Horowitz & ForsterLee, 2001). Furthermore, the current results extend this notion to include
image complexity. Results indicate that image complexity interacted with language complexity
to significantly impact jurors’ ability to understand and process trial information systematically.
Future research should examine other conditions under which image complexity significantly
impacts jurors’ understanding and processing of trial information.
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